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COMMENTS
THE LIABILITY OF A COTENANT TO OTHER
COTENANTS FOR RENTS, PROFITS AND
USE AND OCCUPATION
I. SCOPE
The general subject of this comment is the liability of cotenants, to
each other, for rents, profits and use and occupation. The first part
of the article will deal with the national law on the topic, while the
latter portion will be devoted to a review and discussion of pertinent
Wisconsin law.
II. CommoN LAW PRIOR TO THE STATUTE OF ANNE
At early common law in England ,each cotenant of a tenancy in
common had an equal and several right of entry and possession, and
the possession of one was the possession of all.' This was true, at
one point, even though a cotenant held the common property to the
exclusion of the others. Thus, the cotenants out of possession had no
reason to complain and a suit of partition in equity was their only
remedy.2 As a corollary of this right of possession it followed that
each cotenant had a right to collect rents from third persons to whom
the common property had been rented, and did not have to account to
his fellow cotenants unless appointed bailiff, for the rents were considered products of the land. In the same respect, he was not liable
for profits derived from or the use and occupation of the common
3
property.
III. STATUTE OF ANNE

This harsh and inequitable rule was changed in 1705 by the Statutes 4 and 5 Anne, Chapter 16. This law provided that:
Actions of accounts shall and may be brought and maintained against the executors and administrators of every
guardian, bailiff and receiver; and by one joint tenant and
tenant in common, his executors and administrators, against
the other, for receiving more than comes to his just share or
proportion....
The result of this statute was that a cotenant who collected rents
from third persons for a letting of the common property, was liable
to his cotenants for their just share of the actual receipts, but was
not liable to them for the profits derived from his use of the property
or for his sole occupancy of the entire premises. 4 It should be noted
1Lohmann v. Lohmann, 50 N.J. S. 37, 141 A. 2d 84 (1958).
2 George v. McGovern, 83 Wis. 555, 53 N.W. 899 (1892).
3 Cutter v. Currier, 54 Me. 81 (1866) ; Hill v. Jones, 118 Conn. 12, 170 Atl. 154

(1934) ; Lohmann v. Lohmann, 50 N.J.S. 37, 141 A. 2d 84 (1958) ; Henderson
v. Eason, 17 Q.B. 701, 117 Eng. Rep. 1451 (1851) ; Early v. Friend, 16 Gratt.
21, 78 Am. Dec. 469 (1860).
4 Cohen v. Cohen, 157 Ohio St. 503, N.E. 2d 77 (1952).
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that the action of account under the Statute of Anne was quite different than the action of account against a bailiff prior to 1705. Previously the bailiff was answerable not only for actual receipts, but
also for what he might have made of the land without his wilfull
default, while under the statute if the cotenant was sued as bailiff he
was liable only for the actual receipts retained beyond his just share. 5
In addition, the action under the statute was a legal remedy rather
than equitable.6
The leading case in England on the Statute of Anne is Henderson
v. Eason,7 decided in 1851. In that case the tenant out of possession
was attempting to recover a share of the profits derived from the
cultivation of farmlands by the tenant in possession, and the court
decided that a cotenant receives more than his share or just proportion only when he retains the whole of the rents from the third persons who have leased the common property. The statute, said the
court, does not apply to situations where the cotenant in sole possesion
merely occupies the common property or where he occupies it and
derives a profit from it by cultivation and so forth. In regard to the
former situation the court felt it would be inequitable to hold that a
cotenant became liable to pay rent or anything in the nature of compensation merely because of simple occupation of the common
premises, for each cotenant has a perfect right to enjoy the property
to its full extent. The court also felt that a cotenant in sole possession
need not share the profits derived from the common property, for he
is not receiving more than his just share when he takes the whole of
the profits, but is merely taking the return from his own skill and
labor. Besides, since the risk is his alone, he is entitled to all the
profits.
The court, in reaching this decision, pointed out that the statute
did not actually spell out what a cotenant is liable for, but merely says
he is liable for "receiving more than comes to his just share or proportion." Then, emphasizing the word "receiving," the court reached
the conclusion that the statute could only apply to a third person rental
situation, for in the case of profits or use and occupation the cotenant
in possession is really not receiving, but merely taking the benefit of
the common property to whcih he has a perfect right as owner of
an undivided one half.
The case of Henderson v. Eason is still good law in England
today, and the English cases have continued to construe the statute
very narrowly." Not only is the statute inapplicable where a recovery
5 Wheeler v. Horne, Willes 208, 125 Eng. Rep. 1135 (1740).
6 Cohen v. Cohen, 157 Ohio St. 503, 106 N.E. 2d 77 (1952).
17 Q.B. 701, 117 Eng. Rep. 145 (1851).
s Cohen v. Cohen, 157 Ohio St. 503, 106 N.E. 2d 77 (1952).
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for use and occupation is sought, but also it does not apply to profits
derived from the land, even in a situation where timber or minerals
have been exploited.'
IV.

MAJORITY POSITION IN THE UNITED STATES

In the United States there has been much diversity of opinion over
the construction of the Statute of Anne."' There has also been much
confusion, for the examination of cases has been made difficult in
many instances because of an indiscriminate use of the phrase "rents
and profits." The courts have used this expression without any indication whether the words were intended to mean rents received
from third parties, liability for personal occupancy, profits derived
from a use of the land, or profits extracted from the land.1 ' An
example of this is the case of Garber v. Whittaker, 2 where it was
stated generally that the occupant must account for "rents and profits,"
but the narrow holding was that he must account for rents received.
However, despite this element of confusion, it very clearly appears that the majority opinion in the United States favors the liability
of a cotenant for rentals received from third persons, but does not
sanction a recovery of reasonable rental value, or a share of the profits
for use and occupation, unless there is an ouster or agreement. 13 The
majority opinion in the United States does not go as far as England,
however, in saying that no liability attaches when minerals are extracted or timber is cut, for in this country a cotenant is accountable
for taking anything which is part of the real estate.' 4 Sometimes
this majority rule is based on a statute more or less similar to the
Statute of Anne, 15 and sometimes this result is arrived at without the
mention of any statute, 6 for it has been said that the Statute of
Anne was engrained in the common law of the United States long
prior to the Revolution.'

7

Thus, in this country, a cotenant who has collected rents from a
third party, is liable to his fellow cotenants for their proportionate
share, when the leasing of the common property is binding on all
interests, or purports to bind all interests and is acquiesced in by all,
and the third party has enjoyed exclusive possession.'" The cotenant
92 AMERICAN LAW OF PROPERTY 59 (1952).
'o Aldrich v. Stevens, 115 Vt. 379, 61 A. 2d 551 (1948).
"1 Boyle v. Kempkin, 243 Wis. 86, 9 N.W. 2d 589 (1943).
12:36 Del. 272, 174 AtI. 34 (1934).
132 AMERICAN LAW OF PROPERTY 60 (1952) ; 51 A.L.R. 2d 395.

- Petraborg v. Zontelli, 217 Minn. 536, 15 N.W. 2d 174 (1944).
15 See infra, section VI.
', Fielder v. Childs, 73 Ala. 567 (1883) ; Gayle v. Johnston, 80 Ala. 395 (1885).
'1 14 Am. JuR., Cotenancy §31 (1936).

Is Mastbaum v. Mastbaum, 126 N.J. Eq. 366, 9 A. 2d 51 (1939); Garber v.
Whittaker, 36 Del. 272, 174 At]. 34 (1934); Shenson v. Shenson, 124 Cal.

App. 747, 269 P. 2d 170 (1934) ; Self v. Self, 212 Ala. 512, 103 So. 591 (1925) ;

Armstrong v. Rodemacher, 199 Iowa 928, 203 N.W. 23 (1925); Zwergel v.

Zwergel, 224 Mich. 31, 194 N.W. 505 (1923); Pool v. Pool, 214 Ky. 267, 283
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who has so collected the rents is considered to be holding the funds
as trustee, " for the benefit of his cotenants, and he must account to
them for the actual receipts and cannot discharge himself by paying
over the reasonable rental value of his cotenants' share.20 However,
such a cotenant is not liable for that proportion of rents collected
2
referrable to improvements made by him alone. 1
At this point it should be emphasized that the letting must be binding on all interests, or at least purport to bind all interests and be
22
acquiesced in by all, before a cotenant is liable for collected rents.
This is so, for a cotenant may explicitly rent out only his undivided
interest, and then the lessee, in effect, merely becomes a cotenant of
the other co-owners. 23 In such a situation, it is apparent that the
lessor is not liable to his cotenants for rents collected under the lease,
even though the lessee enjoyed sole possession of the property. In
the same vein, it may be observed that a cotenant cannot bind his fellow
cotenants by a lease purportedly binding all interests for he is not
their agent, and his fellow co-owners can treat the lease as not binding
on their interests.'4 Where such an election is made, the co-owners
obviously do not have any interest in the rents collected by the leasing
cotenant. Apparently, it is also possible for cotenants to waive their
right to a share of the rents collected where they have failed to make
any demand for, and tacitly consented to the retention of all rents
by one only of the cotenants. 5
When rents collected from third persons take the form of crops,
it should be remembered that in some states arrangements with croppers are not considered to create the relationship of landlord and
tenant, and hence the person in possession of the land may be considered an employee of the cotenant receiving the crop payment.
rather than his lessee. If such is the case, the cotenant is not liable
2G
to his fellow co-owners for any share of the crops taken by him.
While a cotenant is clearly liable by the majority rule for rents
S.W. 111 (1926) ; Lake v. Ried, 252 S.W. 2d 978 (Tex. Civ. App. 1952) ; White-

head v. Hinton, 209 N.C. 392, 184 S.E. 66 (1936) ; Nevarou v. Nevarou, 117 Cal.

App. 2d 581, 256 P. 2d 330 (1953); Bates v. Hamilton, 144 Mo. 1, 45 S.W.

641 (1898); Gayle v. Johnston, 80 Ala. 395 (1885); Womach v. Sandygren,
107 Wash. 80, 180 Pac. 922 (1919) ; Danial v. Danial, 106 Wash. 659, 181 Pac.
215 (1919); Kahnovsky v. Kahnovsky, 67 R.I. 208, 21 A. 2d 569 (1941);

Allen v. Jones, 56 App. D.C. 245, 12 F. 2d 186 (1926); Walton v. Walton,
287 Mich. 557, 283 N.W. 687 (1939); Sullivan v. Sullivan, 300 Mich. 640,

'1
20
21

2 N.W. 2d 799 (1942).
Bates v. Hamilton, 144 Mo. 1, 45 S.W. 641 (1898).
Armstrong v. Rodemacher, 199 Iowa 928, 203 N.W. 23 (1925) ; Pool v. Pool,

214 Ky. 267, 283 S.W. 111 (1926).
Moore v. Blount, 160 So. 319 (La. App. 1935).

22.0ake v. Ried, 252 S.W. 2d 978 (Tex. Civ. App. 1952).
23 Shepardson v. Rowland, 28 Wis. 108 (1871).
242 AMERICAN LAW OF PROPERTY 59 (1952) ; 49 A.L.R. 2d

797.

2' Hermance v. Weisner, 228 Wis. 501, 279 N.W. 608 (1938).
26 Cochran v. Leonard, 204 Ala. 163, 85 So. 693 (1920).
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collected from third persons, it is also clearly the majority opinion that
he is not accountable to his fellow cotenants for the use and occupation
of the common premises when he has had sole possession, unless there
is an ouster or agreement.2 ' The reasoning behind this rule is that
since each cotenant has a right to occupy the common property, it
follows that one of them cannot collect rent or other compensation
28
from another for having exercised that right.
The law as to rents is clear, as shown above, but when the word
"profits" enters the picture, there is some difficulty because of the
fact that it may apply to a variety of revenues and benefits, received,
earned and extracted. However the better supported rule is that a
cotenant is not liable to another for the gains or profits resulting from
his use or occupancy of the common premises in the absence of an
ouster or agreement. 29 In the United States, however, this rule does
not apply to the taking or disposal of that which is a part of the land
itself and not ordinarily severable in normal use.30 As the majority
holds that there is no liability for use and occupation, it is only logical
that it would hold the same way as to profits, for to allow the recovery
of profits would be to a large extent to undermine its position as to
use and occupation. The basis of the majority rule as to profits is
simply that such profits are the result of the labor and skill of the
occupant, and the cotenant out of possession has no right to share in
the fruits of the occupant's toil.31 A contrary rule would merely
encourage indolence, and since the cotenant out of possession does
32
not share in the risks he should not share in the profits.
In the Alabama case of Rehfuss v. McAndrew, 33 a fine distinction
was made between income resulting from the labor of the occupant,
27

Whitehead v. Hinton, 209 N.C. 392, 184 S.E. 66 (1936); Navarou v. Navarou,
117 Cal. App. 2d 581, 256 P. 2d 330 (1953); Petrone v. Petrone, 248 App.
Div. 908, 290 N.Y.S. 707 (1936); Utah Oil Refining Co. v. Leigh, 98 Utah
149, 96 P. 2d 1100 (1939); Lake v. Ried, 252 S.W. 2d 978 (Tex. Civ. App.
1952); Brown v. Havens, 17 N.J. Super. 235, 85 A. 2d 812 (1952); Feske v.
Quint, 274 Mass. 169, 174 N.E. 196 (1931); Williams v. Sinclair Refining Co.,
39 N.M. 388, 47 P. 2d 910 (1935) ; Taylor v. Farmers' and Gardners' Market
Asso., 295 Ky. 126, 173 S.W. 2d 803 (1943) ; Minion v. Warner, 185 App. Div.
246, 173 N.Y. Supp. 69 (1918); Reynolds v. Wilmeth, 45 Iowa 693 (1887);
(But compare Van Veen v. Van Veen, 213 Iowa 323, 238 N.W. 718 (1931));
Hamby v. Wall, 48 Ark. 135, 2 S.W. 705 (1887) ; Kalnovsky v. Kabnovsky,
67 R.I. 208, 21 A. 2d 569 (1941); Allen v. Jones, 56 App. D.C. 245, 12 F.
2d 186 (1926); Everts v. Beach, 31 Mich. 136, 18 Am. Rep. 169 (1880);
Walton v. Walton, 287 Mich. 557, 283 N.W. 687 (1939) ; Sullivan v. Sullivan,
300 Mich. 640, 2 N.W. 2d 799 (1942).
2sUtah Oil Refining Co. v. Leigh, 98 Utah 149, 96 P. 2d 1100 (1939).
29 Burk v. Burk, 247 Ala. 91, 22 So. 2d 609 (1945); Zwergel v. Zwergel, 224
Mich. 31, 194 N.W. 505 (1923); Utah Oil Refining Co. v. Leigh, 98 Utah
149, 96 P. 2d 1100 (1939); McWhorter v. McWhorter, 99 Cal. App. 293,
278 Pac. 454 (1929).
30 See supra note 14.
31
See Henderson v. Eason, supra note 7.
32
Black v. Black, 91 Cal. App. 2d 328, 204 P. 2d 950 (1949).
33250 Ala. 55, 33 So. 2d 16 (1947).
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and rentals received from third persons. In that decision the court
ruled that income received from boarders is not rent and the cotenant
in possession did not have to account for it, for the lodger did not
have exclusive possession of the premises and the income was the
result of the occupying tenant's labor. The court then intimated that
if the cotenant had rented out an apartment, rather than just taking
in boarders, he would have been accountable, for the amount received
would have been rent.
34
Also of interest are the two Michigan cases of Zweigel v. Zweigel,
and Walton v. Walton.35

In the former case the cotenants involved

owned a business property as tenants in common. The defendant had
conducted a store business in these common premises, but the stock
in trade of the business was owned solely by the defendant. The
court, in this decision, said the plaintiff had no right to share in the
profits of the business, nor was the defendant liable for the reasonable rental value of the premises. In the latter case, where once again
the defendant conducted a business on the common property, the
court ruled that he did not have to account for the reasonable rental
value of the property, but must account to his cotenant for her share
in the profits of the business, where the stock in trade was jointly
owned, and the defendant was managing the business under a court
order.
V. MINORITY POSITION IN THE UNITED STATES
There are a small number of jurisdictions in the United States
which hold that a cotenant in exclusive possession of the common
property is liable to his cotenants for use and occupation, although
There has not been an ouster or agreement.36 Some courts have done
this by a liberal interpretation of local statutes similar to the Statute
of Anne, 37 others by specific statute,3 8 and others without any men-

tion of a statute. 39
In jurisdictions where a local statute is similar to or the same as
the Statute of Anne, the courts usually follow one of two lines of
reasoning in reaching the conclusion that there is liability for use and
occupation. They either say that their statute is sufficiently different
from the Statute of Anne to justify a departure from the majority
34224 Mich. 31, 194 N.W. 505 (1923).
35287 Mich. 557, 283 N.W. 687 (1939).
362 AMERICAN LAW OF PROPERTY 62 (1952).
3 Early v. Friend, 16 Gratt. 21, 78 Am. Dec. 469 (1860) ; White v. Stuart, 76
Va. 546 (1882) ; Schroeder v. Woodward, 116 Va. 506, 82 S.E. 192 (1914) ;
Ward v. Ward, 40 W. Va. 611, 21 S.E. 746 (1895); Cohen v. Cohen, 157
Ohio St. 503, 106 N.E. 2d 77 (1952); West v. Wever, 46 Ohio St. 66, 18
N.E. 537 (1888) ; Aldrich v. Stevens, 115 Vt. 379, 61 A. 2d 551 (1948)
Clarke v. Clarke, 349 Ill 642, 183 N.F. 13 (1932).
3 VanVeen v. VanVeen, 213 Iowa 323, 238 N.W. 718 (1931).
3e McKnight v. Basilides, 19 Wash. 2d 391, 143 P. 2d 307 (1943) ; Tesar v. Leu,
156 Neb. 528, 56 N.W. 2d 803 (1953); Winn v. Winn, 131 Neb. 650, 269
N.W. 376 (1936).
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rule40 or that the English construction of the Statute is too narrow
and unduly emphasizes the term "receiving." 41
Of course the real basis of any minority decision is the belief
that since the occupying cotenant has had the full use of his cotenant's
share, it is only just that he should pay for this privilege. This is
very clearly brought out in the Washington decision of McKnight v.
Basilides,42 where the court decided that a cotenant, who had the sole
possession of an urban residence was liable to his cotenants for their
share of the fair rental value of the premises. The court, after reviewing Washington cases evidencing a variety of doctrines, declined to follow the majority rule, although recognizing its prevalence
in the United States. The court stated that there was no sound basis
for the majority rule and there was no possible reason for allowing
a cotenant in the sole possession of the common property to reap a
financial benefit, without paying for the use of that share of the
property owned by his cotenants.
Generally speaking, the recovery allowed in the minority jurisdictions for use and occupation is the reasonable rental value of the
shares owned by the cotenants out of possession. 43 The courts seem
to feel this is more just than allowing a recovery of a share of the
profits, for under this rule the occupant does not lose the benefit of
his labor and skill when large profits are realized, and the cotenant
out of possession does not take the risk that the occupant is a poor
manager.44 However, there are some cases where the occupant has
been held liable for the actual profits earned by using and occupying
45
the common property.
Apparently, even in a jurisdiction committed to the minority rule,
a cotenant may waive his right to a recovery for use and occupation
from a cotenant in sole possession, for in the Ohio decision of Aubrey
v. Aubrey,4 6 the court reached such a conclusion. It should be noted,
however, that the demand for accounting was incidental to a partition
suit and equitable principles were involved.
In jurisdictions which normally adhere to the majority rule, it
sometimes happens that an occupying cotenant is held liable for use
See supra note 6.
Early v. Friend, 16 Gratt. 21, 78 Am. Dec. 469 (1860).
42 19 Wash. 2d 391, 143 P. 2d 391, 143 P. 2d 307 (1943).
43 McKnight v. Basilides, 19 Wash. 2d 391, 143 P. 2d 307 (1943); Early v.
Friend, 16 Gratt. 21, 78 Am. Dec. 469 (1860); Tesar v. Leu, 156 Neb. 528,
56 N.W. 2d 803 (1953); VanVeen v. VanVeen, 213 Iowa 323, 238 N.W. 718
(1931) ; Alrich v. Stevens, 115 Vt. 379, 61 A. 2d 551 (1948).
44 See supra note 41.
45 Pistole v. Lanier, 214 Ky. 290, 283 S.W. 88 (1926); Barnes v. Kidwell, 245
Ky. 740, 54 S.W. 2d 331 (1932); (But compare Taylor v. Farmers' and
Gardeners' Market Asso., 295 Ky. 126, 173 S.W. 2d 803 (1943); Pattison v.
Pattison, 207 Okla. 46, 247 P. 2d 514 (1952); (But compare Eysenbach v.
Naharkey, 110 Okla. 207, 236 Pac. 619 (1924)).
40 70 Ohio App. 298, 45 N.E. 2d 892 (1941).
40
41
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and occupation, even though no ouster or agreement is involved, when
the nature of the common property is such as to preclude any practical
joint occupancy. This is especially true in cases of individual residences and small business establishments.4
VI. STATUTES

There are various statutes dealing with the problems of the liability
of a cotenant for rents and profits, and use and occupation. Some
states, among them New York, Virginia and West Virginia, have
statutes very similar to the original Statute of Anne. In New York
the statute is so construed as to hold a cotenant liable for rents collected, but there is no accountability for mere use and occupation. 4s
In Virginia 49 and West Virginia,50 the statute is given a much broader
construction, however, and the occupant is liable for both rentals collected and use and occupation.
In Vermont, a cotenant is liable for

"...

receiving more than his

just proportion of an estate or interest
."51 The addition of the
words "estate or interest" distinguish this statute from the Statute of
Anne, and it has been interpreted as authorizing a recovery for both
rentals collected, and use and occupation. The court in Alrich v.
Stevens,52 stated that the statute was similar to the Statute of Anne,
but still refused to adopt the English construcion.
Two states, namely Illinois and Rhode Island, have very similar
statutes. In Illinois the operative words of the statute are that a
cotenant is liable when he "... . shall take and use the profits or bene-

fits thereof in greater proportion than his, her, or their interest ....
In Rhode Island, the statute reads that when a cotenant shall ".

.

"

. take,

receive, use or have benefit thereof, in greater proportion than his or
her interest . . .", he is liable to his cotenant.- 4 It is readily apparent
that these statutes are radically different from the Statute of Anne by
virtue of the words "take" and "use". While these two statutes are
quite similar to one another in scope and verbage, they have been
given varying constructions in their respective jurisdictions. In
Rhode Island, which probably has the broader statute, the court in
Kahnovsky v. Kahnovsy, 55 decided that a cotenant, while liable for
rentals collected, was not liable for use and occupation in the absence
47 Lohmann v. Lohmann, 50 N.J.S. 37, 141 A. 2d 84 (1958); Edsall v. Merrill,
37 N.J. Eq. 114 (Ch. 1883); Oechsner v. Courcier, 155 S.W. 2d 963 (Tex.
Civ. App. 1941); Winkler v. Craven, 265 S.W. 2d 191 (Tex. Civ. App.
1954).
48 Petrone v. Petrone, 248 App. Div. 918, 290 N.Y.S. 707 (1936).
4 See supra, note 41.
50 Ward v. Ward, 40 W. Va. 611, 21 S.E. 746 (1895).
51 Vt. Stats. §1947 (1947). (Emphasis supplied).
52 See supra note 10 (Emphasis supplied).
53IlI Rev. Stat. C. 76, §5 (1953). (Emphasis supplied).
54 Gen. Laws of R.I. tit. 10, C. 2, §3. (Emphasis supplied).
55 67 R.I. 208, 21 A. 2d 569 (1941).
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of an ouster or agreement. In Illinois, however, a cotenant is liable
under the statute for both rent received and use and occupation. 56
A fourth classification of statutes is those in which a cotenant is
liable for receiving more than his just proportion of the rents and
profits of the estate. Jurisdictions with such statutes include Michigan,5 7 Minnesota,.5 Ohio, 59 and the District of Columbia."0 It should
be noted that the difference between these statutes and the Statute of
Anne, lies principally in the addition of the words "rents and profits,"
and hence, they are capable of a broader construction to the extent of
this addition. 61 It is quite apparent that the addition of the word
"rents" can add nothing to the majority construction of the Statute
of Anne, for that word in conjunction with the word "receiving"
limits its application to rents collected from third persons. However,
the term "profits" is a new factor which, especially in view of the
many possible definitions of the word, could conceivably broaden the
prevailing interpretation of the Statute of Anne. An examination of
the cases from the above mentioned jurisdictions does not bear out
this contention, however. In general, the courts have not placed much
emphasis on the verbiage of the statute concerned, with the exception
of Ohio, but rather have stated the rules in terms of previous case law.
Ohio is alone in construing statutes of this sort to include liability
for use and occupation. In the case of Cohen v. Cohen,6 2 the court
stated that the Ohio statute was different from the Statute of Anne,
by virtue of the addition of the words "rents and profits," and the
omission of the words limiting the liability of the cotenant to that of
a bailiff, and hence a different interpretation was justified. The
court also noted that its statute did not provide for a legal remedy as
-6 Clarke v. Clarke, 349 Ill. 642, 183 N.E. 13 (1932).
57 MICH. ComB. LAws §554. 138 (1948) : "One joint tenant or tenant in common,

and his executors or administrators, may maintain an action for money had
and received, against his cotenant, for receiving more than his just proportion
of the rents or profits of the estate owned by them as joint tenants or
tenants in common."
58 MiNN. STAT. §557.06 (1953): "One joint tenant or tenant in common, and
his executors or administrators, may maintain an action against his cotenant
for receiving more than his just proportion of the rents and profits of the
estate owned by them as joint tenants or tenants in common."
59 OHIo Ray. CoDE §5307.21 (1953): "One tenant in common, or co-parcener,
may recover from another his share of rents and profits received by such
tenant in common or co-parcener from the estate, according to the justice
and equity of the case."
60 DIST. oF COL. CoDE §16-1301 (1951): "...
any tenant in common who may
have received the rents and profits of the property to his own use may be
required to account to his cotenants for their respective shares of said rents
and profits ......
61 Although Wis. STAT. §234.21 (1957), on the subject of the liability of coten-

ants for rents and profits will be treated in detail later in section IX, infra,
it should be noted at this point that the Wisconsin Statute is very similar
to statutes of all the above four states, and in particular is almost an exact
duplicate of the Michigan and Minnesota statutes. Hence, much of what
is said here will apply to Wisconsin.
62 See supra note 6.

MARQUETTE LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 42

did the Statute of Anne, but rather provided for an account according
to the principles of equity. In the last analysis, the court feels that a
cotenant in sole possession of the common premises has received a
benefit, as he owns only one half of the property, and, accordingly, he
must pay to his cotenant the reasonable rental value of his share.
In Minnesota, there is some indication that a cotenant is liable
for his sole possession, but an examination of the cases would seem
to disprove this. In the case of Hoverson v. Hoverson,63 an action involving a general guardian's account, the court, in an obiter dictum
statement, mentioned that a cotenant who had been in sole possession
of farmlands could have been held liable to his cotenants under the
Minnesota statute, in a suit for an accounting of the income, had they
so chosen to proceed. However, an examination of the Minnesota
cases shows that its statute is interpreted to ground liability only for
rentals received in the absence of an ouster or agreement.64 For example, in the case of Arnold v. DeBooy, 65 the court said that each
cotenant has the right to occupy the common property, owns the crops
he raises thereon, and is not liable for rents and profits unless he has
excluded his cotenants or agreed to share with them. The rationale
of the rule is that each cotenant has, at all times, the right to enter
66
upon and enjoy the common property.
In Michigan, there also seems to be some intimation that a cotenant is liable for use and occupation under its statute, but this appears to be a remote possibility upon a review of the cases. In the
cases of Frenzel v. Hayes,6 7 and Zwergel v. Zwergel,6 8 the statement
is made that a cotenant who occupies the common property exclusively, is not liable for its rental value when he occupies with the consent
of his cotenants. These statements seem to imply that without such
consent the occupant would be liable. However, once again, an
examination of the cases shows that a cotenant in Michigan is only
liable for rentals received from third parties, and does not have to
account for use and occupation. 69 An illustration of this is found in
the case of Everts v. Beach,7 0 where the court stated that a tenant in
common was not liable for use and occupation in the absence of any
63 216 Minn. 237, 12 N.W. 2d 497 (1943).
64 Hause v. Hause, 29 Minn. 252, 13 N.W. 43 (1882) ; Kirsh v. Scandia American
Bank, 160 Minn. 269, 199 N.W. 88 (1924); Arnold v. DeBooy, 161 Minn.
255, 201 N.W. 437 (1924); Petraborg v. Zontelli, 217 Minn. 536, 15 N.W.
2d 174 (1944).
65 161 Minn. 255, 201 N.W. 437 (1924).
66 Petraborg v. Zontelli, 217 Minn. 536, 15 N.W. 2d 174 (1944).
67242 Mich. 631, 219 N.W. 740 (1928).
68 224 Mich. 31, 194 N.W. 505 (1923).
69 Sullivan v. Sullivan, 300 Mich. 640 2 N.W. 2d 799 (1942) ; Walton v. Walton,
287 Mich. 557, 283 N.W. 687 (1939); Everts v. Beach, 31 Mich. 136, 18 Am.
Rep. 169 (1880); DesRoches v. McCrary, 315 Mich. 611, 24 N.W. 2d 511
(1946).
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express promise, for the right of each to occupy is one of the legal
incidents of such tenancy and it pervades the whole land.
In the District of Columbia the court has apparently decided that
there is liability under the statute only for rentals received, and no
recovery can be had for use and occupation unless there has been an
7
ouster or agreement. '

In Iowa we have an example of a statute which specifically allows
a recovery for use and occupation, by the cotenant out of possession,
from the occupant." In the case of VawVeen v. VwVeen,73 the court
said this statute modified the former rule, and an ouster, agreement,
or collection of rents from strangers no longer need be shown to allow
a recovery.

VII.

THE EFFECT OF OUSTER

The majority rule in regard to ouster is that a cotenant, who ousts
his fellow co-owners and remains in sole possession of the premises,
is liable for the rental value of their share, for the period of the
exclusion. 74 This proposition seems to be in complete accord with
the majority rule, that normally there is no liability for use and occupation, for that rule is based on the premise that each cotenant has
an equal right to occupy the common property, and when this right is
denied it is only fair that a new rule apply.
While a refusal by the occupying cotenant to permit his fellow
cotenants to share in the possession of the common property is the
basis of most ousters, it should be noted that mere sole possession or,
as it is sometimes referred to, mere exclusive possession, is not considered an ouster.75 This follows, of course, from the majority rule
as to use and occupation, for if it were not so there would be liability
in every case. One difficulty which will be encountered in cases of
this sort, is the courts' rather loose handling of the phrases "exclusive
possession" and "to the exclusion", so as to suggest that an ouster is
present while actually the courts are referring to a case of sole
70

possession only.

The normal recovery in a case where an ouster is present, is the
71 Allen v. Jones, 56 App. D.C. 245, 12 F. 2d 186 (1926).
72

Code of Iowa §557.16 (1954): ". . . it shall be lawful for any one or more
of said tenants in common, not in possession, to sue for and recover, from
such tenants in possession, his or their proportionate part of the rental value

of said real estate . . .
73 See supra note 38.
74 2 AmERICAN LAW OF PROPERTY 56 (1952)

; Steward v. Steward, 90 Wis. 516
(1895); Sons v. Sons, 151 Minn. 360, 186 N.W. 811 (1922); Estate of Wallace, 270 Wis. 636, 72 N.W. 2d 383 (1955); Harlan v. Harlan, 74 Cal. App.
2d 555, 168 P. 2d 985 (1946); Lovett v. Stone, 239 N.C. 206, 79 S.E. 2d 479
(1954); Hill v. Jones, 118 Conn. 12, 170 Atl. 154 (1934); Youmans v. Youmans, 128 S.C. 31, 121 S.E. 674 (1924).
5
7 Williams v. Sinclair Refining Co., 39 N.M. 388, 47 P. 2d 910 (1935) ; Hill v.
Jones, 118 Conn. 12, 170 Atl. 154 (1934).
76 See supra note 41.
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fair rental value of the common premise in proportion to the ousted
cotenants' share in the ownership, rather than a share in the profits
realized.7 7 However, in the case of Youmens v. Youmens 8s a South
Carolina decision, there is a suggestion that an ousted cotenant can
recover either the fair rental value or a share of the profits. In jurisdictions which demand an ouster before predicating liability for use
and occupation. the normal rule appears to be that there is no liability
for a mere refusal of a demand to pay rent or to vacate, when the
occupant doesn't exclude the tenant out of possession.79 This, again,
is in line with the majority rule that all cotenants have an equal right
to the occupancy of the common property. However, there are cases
where an occupant has been held accountable for use and occupation,
when normally he wouldn't be, because he did refuse a demand for
rent made by the tenant out of possession."0 In these cases, however,
the courts were usually dealing with urban, single family residences,
and as was mentioned before, the majority rule is sometimes modified
when the property is not susceptible to joint occupancy.
In some states liability for use and occupation follows from an
"ouster or exclusion," and sometimes the word "exclusion" is so construed as to apply to situations where an ouster in the strict sense is
not present."' The word has been defined as a "very elastic term"
which may be actual or constructive, and there is no firm test which
may be applied to all cases.8 2 It is obvious that such an interpretation
would leave much to the discretion of the court.
VIII.

EQUITABLE SETOFF IN PARTITION

In partition proceedings or other cases where equitable principles
are applied, a recovery for use and occupation is frequently allowed
as a defensive setoff, when the tenant in possession wishes to obtain
contribution for expenditures made for improvements or for the protection and preservation of the property, even though he otherwise
would not be accountable.8 3 In Frenzel v. Hayes, 4 the court stated
AMERICAN LAW oF PROPERTY 63 (1952); Steward v. Steward, 90 Wis. 516
(1895) ; Sons v. Sons, 151 Minn. 360, 186 N.W. 811 (1922); Estate of
Wallace, 270 Wis. 636, 72 N.W. 2d 383 (1955).
78 128 S.C. 31, 121 S.E. 674 (1924).
7 Brown v. Havens, 17 N.J. Super. 235, 85 A. 2d 812 (1952); Fiske v. Quint,
274 Mass. 169, 174 N.E. 196 (1931); Williams v. Sinclair Refining Co., 39
N.M. 388, 47 P. 2d 910 (1935).
80 Oechsner v. Courcier, 155 S.W. 2d 963 (Tex. Civ. App. 1941); Winkler v.
Craven, 265 S.W. 2d 191 (Tex. Civ. App. 1954); Pistole v. Lanier, 214 Ky.
290, 283 S.W. 88 (1926); Barnes v. Kidwell, 245 Ky. 740, 54 S.W. 2d 331
(1932) (But compare Taylor v. Farmers' and Gardeners' Market Asso., 295
Ky. 126, 173 S.W. 2d 803 (1943) with the last two cases cited).
81 See supra note 1, dissenting opinion.
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Ibid.

s Frenzel v. Hayes, 242 Mich. 631, 219 N.W. 740 (1928); Forler v. Williams,
257 Mich. 686, 241 N.W. 823 (1932) ; Hoverson v. Hoverson, 216 Minn. 228,
12 N.W. 2d 501 (1943); Kirsh v. Scandia American Bank, 160 Minn. 269,
199 N.W. 881 (1924) ; Fundaburk v. Cody, 261 Ala. 25, 72 So. 2d 710 (1954) ;
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that a cotenant was not normally chargeable with use and occupation,
but where the question arises in partition proceedings in equity, and
particularly where the possession has been exclusive, the rule recognized
in Michigan is that, in adjusting the equities, the occupant who has had
exclusive possession should account for the use and occupation. Also,
see Fowler v. Williains,8 for the proposition that recovery for use and
occupation is restricted to partition suits in Michigan. In the Minnesota
case of Kirsh v. Scandia American Bank,86 it was also held that a
cotenant normally has no duty to account for use and occupation, but
where possession has been exclusive, equitable principles demand that
before the occupant can get contribution, he must apply the net profits
toward the contributions.
The normal setoff in these cases seems to be the reasonable rental
value of the interest of the cotenant who is out of possession,8 7 but
there are cases which say that the setoff should be such cotenant's
share of the profits. 8
Equitable setoff is a defensive measure and when the occupants
claim for improvements or protective expenditures has been denied,
theoretically, the claim of the cotenant out of possession, for use and
occupation should be denied, unless there are other equities present.80
Of course, this principle of equitable setoff will only apply where there
has been no ouster, for when an ouster is present the cotenant out of
possession does not have to await a defensive opportunity to put forth
his claim for use and occupation. In the reverse situation, where the
occupying cotenant has been held liable under any theory for rents
and profits, he is normally to be credited with expenditures for protecting and maintaining the property.90 Very seldom, however, can
the occupant be credited with the value of personal services. 91
IX. WISCONSIN LAW REGARDING THE LIABILITY OF COTENANTS
In general, there is little case law to be found in Wisconsin on the
subject of the liability of cotenants to one another, and what is available is often sketchy and ambiguous. This is true, although there
Roberts v. Roberts, 136 Tex. 255, 150 S.W. 2d 236 (1941); Martin v. Martin,
218 Mo. App. 617, 266 S.W. 336 (1924).
84242 Mich. 631, 219 N.W. 740 (1928).
85 257
86

87

Mich. 686, 241 N.W. 823 (1932).

160 Minn. 269, 199 N.W. 881 (1924).
Martin v. Martin, 218 Mo. App. 617, 266 S.W. 336 (1924); Frenzel v. Hayes,

242 Mich. 631, 219 N.W. 740 (1928); Fundaburk v. Cody, 261 Ala. 25, 72 So.
2d 710 (1954) ; Roberts v. Roberts, 136 Tex. 255, 150 S.W. 2d 236 (1941).

88 See supra note 86; Hoverson v. Hoverson, 216 Minn. 228, 12 N.W. 2d 501

(1943).
Lewis v. Milan, 113 W.Va. 549, 169 S.E. 70 (1933).
King v. King, 163 Or. 84, 95 P. 2d 66 (1939); Knight v. Basilides, 19 Wash.
2d 391, 143 P. 2d 307 (1943) ; Lish v. Wehmeyer, 158 Kan. 339, 147 P. 2(d
712 (1944) ; Shenson v. Shenson, 124 Cal. App. 2d 747, 269 P. 2d 170 (1954).
91 Combs v. Ritter, 100 Cal. App. 2d 315, 223 P. 2d 505 (1950).
89
90
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are three Wisconsin statutes in point, namely sections 275.08,92 275.10,93
94
and 234.21.

In one era, however, the law is quite clear; and that is in an
action of ejectment in which an ouster has been shown under sec.
275.08 and 275.10. By the terms of sec. 275.10 the ousted cotenant
can recover from the cotenant in possession "damages for the rents
and profits of the premises recovered." The Wisconsin cases on the
subject have allowed the ousted cotenant a recovery based on the fair
rental value of his interest in the property, in conformity with the
In allowing this recovery for use and
majority rule on the subject.9
occupation, the statute specifically exempts the value of the use of any

improvements made by the ousting cotenant.
Although a studied judicial interpretation of sec. 234.21 is lacking,
there is not much doubt that it would be construed to impose liability
in a situation where one cotenant has collected and retained all of
the rents. Such an interpretation would, of necessity, seem to follow
in view of the complete unanimity of opinion in the U.S., and the
conformity of this opinion to basic principles of justice and fair
dealing between co-owners of property. In fact, this oneness of
opinion is very likely the reason for the dearth of authority in Wisconsin. In support of this contention, it should be noted that sec.
234.21 is patterned on the Statute of Anne, and also specifically provides for receiving more than a "just proportion of the rents." In
addition, all jurisdictions which have statutes very similar to, or the
same as Wisconsin's, namely Michigan, Minnesota, Ohio and the District of Columbia, hold that a cotenant is liable to his fellow-cotenants
for rentals received. 96
While we do not have a clear cut decision in Wisconsin on the
Stewart v.
topic of rentals, the cases of Shepardson v. Rowland9
§275.08 (1957) : "If the ejectment action be brought by tenants in
common or joint tenants against cotenants the plaintiff must prove that the
defendants ousted him or did some other act amounting to a total denial of
his right as cotenant."
93 WIs. STAT. §275.10 (1957) : "The plaintiff in ejectment may recover damages
for the rents and profits of the premises recovered, during the time the same
are unlawfully withheld, not exceeding six years prior to the commencement
of the action, and damages for injuries to the freehold which damages shall
be assessed by the jury. In estimating such damages the value of the use
of any improvements made by the defendant or those under whom he claims
shall not be allowed."
94 WIS. STAT. §234.21 (1957) : "One joint tenant or tenant in common and his
executors or administrators may maintain an action for money had and
received against his cotenant for receiving more than his just proportion of
the rents or profits of the estate owned by them as joint tenants or tenants
in common."
95 Pacquette v. Pickness, 19 Wis. 219 (1865); Davis v. Louk, 30 Wis. 308
(1872); Steward v. Steward, 90 Wis. 516 (1895) ; Estate of Wallace, 270
Wis. 636, 72 N.W.2d 383 (1955).
9c See Section VI, supra.
97 28 Wis. 108 (1871).
92 Wis. STAT.
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0
Stewart,98 Boyle v. Kempkin,9 9 and Herman v. Weiser,1
throw some

light on the subject. In the first case mentioned the plaintiff was a
tenant in common with the four defendants, who were minors. The
mother of the defendant minors had been appointed their general
guardian. The mother, acting as guardian, had leased the west half of
the common premises to a third person, and had collected the rents under the lease and had, in fact, used them to pay taxes and expenses on
the undivided one half belonging tp the defendants, and the remainder
for the support of herself and the children. This action of money had
and received, under what is now sec. 234.21, was then started to
recover one half of the rents received under the lease. The court
held that, assuming the plaintiff had a cause of action, he should have
brought it against the guardian, for she was the person who had received the money and not the present defendants. The court also
brought up the question of whether the joinder of the defendants was
proper and finally sustained the non-suit. While the court did not
decide whether the plaintiff had a cause of action, the general tenor
of its opinion would seem to suggest that it thought he did, but for the
other difficulties mentioned.
In Stewart v. Stewart, which is an ejectment action, the following
obiter dictum statement is found :'1o

Since the Statute of Anne, which became a part of the
common law of this country, the right to maintain an action
for accountng for rents, issues, and profits has generally, if not
uniformly, been recognized in the United States. In this state
that statute has been, in effect, re-enacted and extended. R.S.
secs. 2199, 3087, 3173, 3192.102
The third case, Boyle v. Kempkin, deals principally with a trust
agreement involving a parcel of land in which the settler and the defendant were cotenants. The court after upholding the validity of the
trust agreement, ruled, without any further explanation or details,
that there was no error in the lower court's direction that the defendant account to the trustee, his cotenant, for rents and profits. The
court then cited sec. 234.21, but it is impossible to tell what type of
rents or profits are involved, or what the theory of recovery is, aside
from the general citation of the statute.
Another case of note is Herman v. Weisner, an action in partition.
The plaintiff in that case had succeeded to the interests of one of seven
98 90 Wis. 516 (1895).
99 243 Wis. 86, 9 N.W. 2d 589 (1943).
100 228 Wis. 501, 279 N.W. 2d 608 (1943).
101 90 Wis. at 521.
102 In regard to the sections of the Revised Statute of 1878, mentioned here,
§2199 is the same as today's §234.21, §3173 is the equivalent of §275.10,
§3173 dealt with the liability of a cotenant for waste, and §3192 was concerned with the joinder of cotenants in various actions.
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children who were tenants in common along with their mother, who
is the defendant in this case. The cotenancy had originated at the
death of the father in 1901, and at that time the defendant leased the
farm to third persons. Over the years she collected the rents and out
of them paid the taxes, insurance, and kept up the ordinary repairs.
She also supported the children during their minority, paid off $6500
in mortgages on the land, and, by virtue of improvements, increased
the value of the premises by $4000. All this was done under the
belief that she was the sole owner. The trial court ruled that she was
entitled to a lien on the property in the amount of $6500 for the mortgage principal she had paid off, and in the amount of $4000 for the
improvements she had made. It did not set off the amount of rent
she had received over the years from leasing the property. The plaintiff appeals on this point, and the court in its opinion conceded that
the general rule was that if a cotenant in possession is to be allowed
a lien for improvements he must also account for the rents and
profits. but held that the rule does not apply in the instant case. The
court pointed out that none of the original cotenants had ever set up
any claim to rents and profits, and the defendant had received and
kept them with their full consent. Hence, they were not now in a
position to insist upon an accounting and neither was one holding
under them. The court also stated that it took judicial notice of the
fact that rentals received only amounted to about $400 yearly, and
that this would hardly compensate the defendant for the interest she
paid on the mortgage, or the sums she expended on taxes and repairs,
for which she had not been given a lien.
It would appear from this case that Wisconsin, in the future, will
hold a cotenant accountable, in partition proceedings where equitable
principles are applied, for rentals received from third persons when
such rentals are used as a setoff, and elements of waiver are not
present. This view is further strengthened by the fact that the court
took judicial notice that the defendant had expended more money on
the property, for which sum she was not credited in this action, than
she took out of the property in the form of rentals. Thus it can be
seen that the result could very well have been a simple case of setting
off the expenditures for interest and repairs against the rentals received, and the latter sum would cancel out the former, leaving the
defendant with her liens for mortgage payments and improvements
intact. Of course, holding a cotenant accountable when he is asking
for contributions for protective expenditures is not the same as saying
that a cotenant is liable per se for rentals received beyond his just
share, but it is one step in that direction.
As mentioned previously in this article, the word "profits", in
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statutes similar to sec. 234.21, is the key to a broad construction
which would include a recovery for use and occupation, even in the
absence of an ouster or agreement. Wisconsin, not unlike other jurisdictions with similar statutes, had not attempted a thorough inspection
of the verbiage of sec. 234.21, and there is very little case law which
deals with the subject of the liability of a cotenant for use and
occupation. While there are no clear cut decisions, nevertheless, some
are helpful in indicating the trend and will, therefore, be reviewed
here.
One of these is McKinley v. Weber,103 an action in trespass, wherein the plaintiff was seeking damages for grasses cut on lands claimed
as his own. The defendant proved that the land in question was owned
by himself and another as tenants in common. In the course of its
opinion ,the court stated that the defendant was liable to account to
his cotenant for the interest of such cotenant in the grass cut and,
consequently, the plaintiff cannot maintain this action. The court then
cited sec. 234.21. The statement by the court that the defendant is
liable to his cotenant is, of course, dictum, but even if it were not,
the case would not be the strongest authority for holding a cotenant
liable for use and occupation or for a share of the profits. Grass is
not a cultivated crop, and it would probably be considered a part of
the real estate and, hence, would fall within the normal rule pertaining
to the severance of real estate by a cotenant.
Stewart v. Stewart, supra, should be mentioned again, for there
we find the dictum statement that the Statute of Anne has been, in
effect, re-enacted and extended in Wisconsin, by virtue of sec. 234.21.
The value of this case is limited, however, by the fact that the court
did not indicate the limits of this extension or whether or not it includes liability for use and occupation.
The case of Werner v. Randall'0 4 is perhaps the strongest Wisconsin authority for the proposition that there is liability for use and
occupation, but even this is far from clear cut. In this case, King
and Clausen were cotenants of a 400 acre farm. In 1915 Clausen had
exclusive possession of the farm under a one year lease from his
cotenant, King. The agreed rental figure for King's share was $1600.
In 1916 King sold his undivided one half share to Randall. Randall,
in turn, conveyed half of his share to Werner, so that for the year
1916, Werner, Randall, and Clausen were cotenants. Werner eventually started this action for partition. The lower court decided that
Clausen was liable to his cotenants for the reasonable rental value of
the farm, in proportion to their share in the ownership, for the year
1916. Clausen appealed from the decision, but the court sustained the
103 37

104

Wis. 279 (1875).

168 Wis. 506, 170 N.W. 727 (1919).
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award. The court stated in its opinion that the farm had not been
leased to third parties during the year 1916, and that the three owners
had not mutually agreed that Clausen should remain in possession, as
he did, at a stipulated rental. After this recital, the court stated that
"The facts and circumstances showing Clausen's possession of the
farm for the year support the court's conclusion holding him liable
for its reasonable rental value." 105
Thus in this case, the occupant was held liable for the reasonable
rental value of the farm, but the court did not cite sec. 234.21, nor is
the exact theory of liability clear. While it is possible that the recovery was based on a holdover by Clausen under the lease between
him and his original cotenant, King, it is not likely, for the liability
was expressed in terms of "reasonable rental value" and not in terms
of "rent under the lease." In addition, Wisconsin does not recognize
that a cotenant who has leased his cotenant's share, and holds over
after the expiration of the lease, continues in possession under the
pact, but rather takes the position that he holds over in his own right
as a cotenant.' 0 6 Again, it is possible that the court is simply holding
Clausen liable, as a cotenant for use and occupation, but this also is
doubtful, for the court did not mention sec. 234.21, and it seems
hardly likely that it could arrive at such a decision without citing the
statute.
What is more probable, it would seem, is that this was simply a
case of equitable setoff or ouster. The theory of equitable setoff is
supported by the fact that the defendant, Clausen, was credited with
$500 worth of expenditures for protection and maintenance of the
property. The theory of an ouster being present is given credence by
the fact that Clausen in his answer claimed the conveyances to
Randall and Werner were fraudulent and void, and it is entirely
possible that under such a state of affairs Clausen had refused to
recognize them as cotenants during the year 1916.
The case of Hermance v. Weisner, supra, while dealing with rents
collected from third parties, should also be noted at this point, for it
bears the implication that Wisconsin might accept the doctrine of
equitable setoff where waiver and consent are not a factor. Whether
this will apply to cases involving use and occupation, of course, cannot be answered at this time, but it should be noted that when the
court conceded that equitable setoff was the normal rule, it used the
broad term "rents and profits" and did not restrict it to rentals received from third parties although such was the subject matter of the
case .
Boyle v. Kempkin, supra, should also be mentioned in conjunction
105
1o

168 WA'is. at 510.
Rockwell v. Luek, 32 Wis. 70 (1873).
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with the subject matter of liability for use and occupation, for although the theory of recovery is not clear, the court, nonetheless, did
order a cotenant to account for "rents and profits", while citing sec.
234.21.
In Rainer v. Holmes,'°7 the question of equitable setoff was again
raised in a partition proceeding. The cotenants in this case were
twelve children who inherited the property upon the death of their
widowed mother. When the mother died in 1936, the plaintiff, one
of the twelve children, moved from Illinois to Wisconsin with her
husband to care for her younger brothers and sisters. She and her
husband moved into the house which comprised the common property,
and continued to live there, all the while maintaining a home and
caring for the orphaned children. The children left, one by one, as
soon as they were able, and all had departed by 1947. Plaintiff continued to live on the common property until the bringing of this suit.
Over the years she had made expenditures in the sum of $3599 for
taxes, repairs, and maintenance, and improvements. The lower court
ruled that the plaintiff was entitled to this amount out of the proceeds of
the sale of the property. The defendant, a fellow cotenant and brother,
appeals from the allowance for improvements, without any offset for
use and occupancy for the years 1947 to 1954, during which time the
plaintiff enjoyed exclusive possession of the premises. The court in
its opinion sustained the allowance and denied any offset for use and
occupation. It stated that where a cotenant has received Tents and
profits from the common property during his occupancy, such rents
and profits can be offset against a claim for improvements by him.
The court is apparently referring to actual rent receipts in this statement. for it goes on to say that what the defendant is seeking in this
case is not an allowance for rents and profits, but an allowance for
the use and occupancy. It continues with the statement that generally
a cotenant is not liable for use and occupancy in the absence of ouster
or agreement, for the law presumes that the possession of one cotenant
is the possession of all. The court then said:
In view of all the authorities, we are of the opinion that an
allowance for use and occupancy in a case such as this should
not be made unless the equities of the particular case require it.
On the basis of this test the court then reviewed the equities and
decided they were all in favor of the plaintiff, in view of her personal
sacrifices. The court also took into consideration the fact that the
plaintiff never excluded any of the cotenants who wished to live there.
The conclusions to be drawn from this case are many and varied.
In the first place, it would seem that the implication drawn from the
107 272 Wis. 349, 75 N.W. 2d 290 (1955).
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case of Herviance v. Weisner, to the effect that actual rental receipts
can be offset against a claim for improvements, is bolstered. However, the possibility of offsetting use and occupancy in Wisconsin has
been made more remote, for the court seems to have missed the point
of equitable setoff completely.
In the case of actual rental receipts the doctrine of equitable setoff
is really meaningless, for, by the majority rule, the cotenant credited
with this offset could have recovered his share of the rentals received
in an independent action, apart from partition proceedings in equity.
When dealing with use and occupancy, however, the majority
rule is that a cotenant in possession is not accountable in an independent action. Hence, the doctrine of equitable setoff was developed
by courts of equity to protect the cotenant who has not enjoyed the
possession of the common premises, but yet is expected to contribute
for improvements of which the occupying cotenant has had the use
and benefit.los Thus, it can be seen that the court in the Rainer case.
when it stated that generally there is no liability for use and occupation, was simply reiterating the majority rule in regard to cases in
which there is not the opportunity to offset use and occupation against
a claim for protective expenditures. What the court seems to miss is
that equitable setoff is a defensive doctrine and cannot apply in a case
of actual rental receipts, for in that situation there is an independent
liability and no defensive opportunity need be awaited. Hence, it can
be seen that in the case of actual rental receipts there cannot logically
be any equitable setoff in the strict sense, for there are no equities to
consider, as the cotenant out of possession has an absolute right to
his share of the rent collected.
While the court in this decision has not recognized the doctrine of
equitable setoff, still it cannot be said that it has denied it either. It
seems rather to have left the "door open" when it stated that an allowance for use and occupation should not be made unless the equities
of the particular case demand it. It must be remembered that the
doctrine is an equitable one and it could be said that this case was
actually permeated with equities which favored the plaintiff. In addition to these two factors, equitable setoff of use and occupancy is
definitely the majority rule and this always must be considered in
any evaluation of a position.
Rainer v. Holmes is obviously not direct authority for the proposition that a cotenant out of possession cannot recover for use and
occupation, in a legal action as prescribed by sec. 234.21, but it certainly is indicative of the court's attitude. The statement that generally there is no liability for use and occupation could hardly be
108

For a detailed justification of equitable setoff see Fundaburk v. Cody, 261
Ala. 25, 72 So. 2d 710 (1954).
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stronger. However, it should be remembered that the sec. 234.21 was
not mentioned in the opinion, and as the statute differs from the
Statute of Anne by virtue of the addition of the words "rents and
profits", there always is the possibility that it could be given a broader
construction.
X. CONCLUSIONS AND RECOiiMENDATIONS

In view of the cases discussed and the overwhelming majority
opinion in the United States ,it is very highly probable that Wisconsin
will allow a cotenant to recover his share of actual rental receipts
from the collecting cotenant. This opinion is further bolstered by the
fact that the Wisconsin statute, sec. 234.21, is patterned generally on
the Statute of Anne, and it is highly unlikely that it could be given a
narrower construction. In addition, the jurisdictions of Minnesota,
Michigan, Ohio, and the District of Columbia,. all of which have
statutes which are -similar to, or the same as Wisconsin's, hold -a
collecting cotenant liable.
A .recovery for use and occupation as an equitable setoff, in partition proceedings is a possihility in Wisconsin, even in view of the
Rainer case, because such is the majority opinion in the United States,
It would be going too far, however ,to say that such a recovery is
probable..
While there is a possibility that an occupying cotenant will be
charged with his use and occupation of the common premises as an
offset in an equitable action, it is highly unlikely that such a charge
will be allowed in Wisconsin where -it cannot be used as a defensive
measure. In other words, the chances of a recovery for use and
occupation are remote in a legal action for money had and received
under -sec. 234.21, or in partition proceedings in equity where the occupant- is not seeking contribution for protective expenditures. This
conclusion is predicated on the fact that such non-liability is the majority rule in the United States, and also among those jurisdictions
which have statutes similar to sec. 234.21. An added factor is the
strong language found in the Rainer case disclaiming such liability.
Because there is not a decisive case on the subject, the possibility
of liability cannot be ruled out, however, for the Wisconsin statute
is sufficiently different from the Statute of Anne, as to be open to a
different interpretation, and this is evident in the Ohio decision of
Cohen v. -Cohen, supra. The case of Werner v. Randall, supra, should
not be forgotten either, for there the cotenant in possession was forced
to account for the reasonable rental value of his use and occupation,
atlhough the exact theory of recovery is not clear.
Since sec. 234.21 is susceptible to a different .construction than the
Statute of Anne, and yet is worded in the same vague, indecisive man-
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ner, it would seem that the Wisconsin statute could be given a compromise interpretation which would combine the best features of the
minority and majority rules in respect to liability for use and occupation.
The majority rule of non-liability is, of course, based on the
premise that each cotenant has a right to occupy the whole of the
common premises and, hence, the occupant should not have to pay
rent for exercising that right when he has not excluded his cotenants.
The minority jurisdictions, on the other hand, simply feel that the
occupying cotenant has had sole possession of the premises, thereby
reaping a financial benefit, and thus should pay for the use of his
cotenants' share.
Under the majority rule, a cotenant in possession is liable for the
reasonable rental value of his use and occupation when he has ousted
his cotenants. An ouster is basically a refusal by the occupant to
allow his fellow cotenants to share in the possession of the property.
However, in this country where urban living is the rule, joint occupancy of the common property is rarely practical and it is highly
unlikely that a cotenant out of possession will demand a share in the
occupancy of the property, a refusal of which will produce the
necessary liability-bearing ouster. What is more likely is that a
cotenant out of possession will make a demand for rent, or will ask
that the cotenants in possession vacate so the common property can
be rented to third persons and rental receipts shared. Thus, if the
majority rule is to prevail, the tenant in possession can refuse a
demand for rent or vacation without fear of liability, and his fellow
cotenants are left without a remedy, aside from partition. In this way
the tenant in possession is reaping a financial benefit, for he has
sole possession, and his cotenants can do nothing about it, for if they
should demand a share in the occupancy of the premises the demand
will most likely be honored since the occupant knows that they will
not physically occupy the property because of the practical difficulties
involved.
The most just rule then, would seem to be a compromise, where
the cotenant in possession is liable for use and occupation not only
when he ousts his fellow cotenant, but also when he refuses a demand
for the payment of rent for his use of the cotenant's share, or when
he refuses to vacate the premises and rent to third parties for the
common benefit. A rule of this type would be a compromise, for a
cotenant in possession would not be liable for the rental value of his
use and occupation in all instances, but only where he has actively
refused to co-operate with his fellow co-owners. Thus it would not
be possible, as it is in mniority jurisdictions today, for the cotenant
out of possession to sit idly by and let the bill for use and occupation
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run up in his favor, all the while seemingly acquiescing in the agreement. Yet, on the other hand, such cotenant will still be given a
measure of protection when the occupant has received more than his
just share of the benefits of the estate by virtue of sole possession.
In view of the present state of Wisconsin law, it is recommended
that when joint occupancy of the common property is not envisioned,
the tenant out of possession, for his own protection, reach an agreement with the occupant in regard to rents and profits. Such agreements are legal, for cotenants can contract with each other regarding
their respective shares, and while cotenants normally have equal rights
of possession, this can be changed by agreement. 0 9 Possible solutions
are partnership agreements or leases between the cotenants. 110
If a cotenant lease is used the result will be a landlord-tenant
relationship with all of the normal rights and duties of such an arrangement. It should be noted at this point that the majority rule is
that a cotenant who holds over after the expiration of such a lease
continues his possession under the lease as a tenant, and not in his
own right as a tenant in common. Hence, he is liable to pay further
rent in the same manner and amount as any lessee who holds over."'
This majority rule is tempered, however, by the fact that when the
cotenant-lessee gives timely notice before the expiration of the term
that he intends to continue in possession as a cotenant rather than as
lessee, he is deemed to have held over in his own right as a co-owner
12
and is not liable for rent under the lease.1
Of course, in a jurisdiction committed to the rule of liability for
use and occupation, this distinction would not be of too much practical
value, for if the cotenant was not liable as a lessee for rent, he would
still be liable for the reasonable rental value of his occupancy as
cotenant.
In some jurisdictions an opposite view is taken on the subject of
the holdover of a cotenant-lessee, the court ruling that the cotenantlessee holds over in his own right as cotenant and is not liable under
the lease for rent."x3 Wisconsin is one of these jurisdictions and in
the case of Rockwell v. Luek,"1 4 the court stated the rule to be that
when a cotenant-lessee holds over he will not be presumed, as in other
cases, to be continuing his possession under the lease, but rather to
be holding by virtue of his original right as tenant in common. How109

Doan v. Doan, 208 Or. 508, 302 P. 2d 565 (1956) ; Dennis v. Wood, 79 Ind.

App. 565, 139 N.E. 187 (1923) ; Davis v. Skinner, 58 Wis. 638, 17 N.W. 427

(1883) ; Newton v. Gardner, 24 Wis. 232 (1869).
See supra note 106.
"'I Vucinich v. Gordon, 51 Cal. App. 2d 434, 124 P. 2d 868 (1942) ; McGinley v.
Cannon, 90 Wash. 311, 155 Pac. 1047 (1916).
112 Peterson v. McNeely, 125 Pa. Super. 55, 189 Atl. 765 (1937).
113 Valentine v. Healey, 178 N.Y. 391, 70 N.E. 913 (1901).
114 See supra note 106.
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ever, if he continues in possession, while recognizing his obligations
and relation as a tenant under the lease, he then occupies subject to
its conditions. In other words, in Wisconsin, more continued occupancy is not enough to form the basis of a holdover under a lease,
where cotenants are concerned. In view of Wisconsin's position, it
can be seen that a lease between cotenants is only a partial solution
to the problem of protecting a cotenant out of possession, especially
where the term of the letting is of relatively short duration.
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